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In this paper, we show that coherent upper and lower previsions as well as coherent risk measures are only meaningful
under the assumption that one starts with initial wealth being constantly 0. This implies at least for coherent upper and
lower previsions a correction of their interpretation, especially coherent upper previsions turn out to represent inﬁmum
short selling prices instead of inﬁmum selling prices and coherent lower previsions represent fair prices. We elaborate this
meaning of coherent lower previsions by identifying a class of coherent variability measures and present a way to extend
coherence to all possible situations of initial wealth. Since a coherent risk measure is the negative of a coherent lower
prevision, all results presented in this paper can easily be reformulated in terms of risk measures. Finally, we sketch
how corresponding results can be obtained when replacing coherence by convexity.
 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Coherent and convex upper and lower previsions are becoming more and more popular as a mathematical
model for robust valuations under uncertainty (cf. [11]). Likewise, the mathematically equivalent classes of
coherent and convex risk measures are attracting a lot attention in mathematical ﬁnance (cf. e.g. [1,2,5]).
The theory of imprecise previsions deals with the problem of consistently valuating gambles, i.e. bounded, real
valued functions representing an uncertain monetary reward. A minimal consistency condition is avoiding sure
loss, more sophisticated ones are coherence and convexity. A lower prevision represents the supremum of
prices one is willing to pay for obtaining a gamble. Commonly, the conjugate of a lower prevision, the upper
prevision, is interpreted to represent an inﬁmum selling price.
After providing the preliminaries in Section 2, we discuss some interpretations in the theory of imprecise
previsions in Section 3 and indicate some points where this theory has some vacancies to be ﬁlled. One of these
is the distinction of desirability and acceptability that is made in the theory of imprecise previsions without0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2007.06.010
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are so far only considered when they are oﬀered. In Section 4, we then show that once one takes also gambles
that one initially holds into account there is some need to complete the theory of imprecise previsions as other-
wise the whole theory of imprecise previsions fails to be applicable after the ﬁrst buying or short sale. To solve
this problem, we present a class of functionals in two variables, the coherent fair previsions, extending coher-
ent lower previsions in the sense that every coherent fair prevision represents the supremum buying price for
the ﬁrst gamble given the second, initially held gamble. It turns out that a coherent upper prevision in contrast
to the common interpretation does not represent the inﬁmum selling price but the inﬁmum short selling price
(in case the initial gamble is 0). Furthermore, a coherent lower prevision does not only represent the supre-
mum buying price (in case the initial gamble is 0) but also the inﬁmum selling price (in case the initial gamble
is the gamble to be sold) and therefore a fair price. Non-linearity of this fair price functional can be interpreted
as a result of taking the risk in the sense of variability of a gamble into account when evaluating the fair price.
Therefore, we discuss in Section 5 a decomposition of coherent lower previsions into a fair risk-neutral price
(represented by a linear prevision, e.g. an expected value) and a price for the riskiness/variability of the gamble
(represented by the newly introduced coherent variability measure). Finally, we show in Section 6 how the pre-
sented results can be transferred to the convex model by providing a deﬁnition of convex fair previsions.
Although not explicitly mentioned in the following, all results on coherent lower previsions can easily be
expressed in terms of coherent risk measures, too. This is due to the fact that a coherent risk measure is
the negative of a coherent lower prevision (cf. [7, p. 86]).
2. Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, let X be a non-empty set and K denote a non-empty subset of the linear space of
bounded, real-valued functions on X,L1. In the theory of imprecise previsions (cf. Walley [11]), every X 2K
is called a gamble and interpreted as an uncertain reward (usually in terms of money1). A transaction is the net
uncertain reward X  l when buying a gamble X for the price l. A functional P :K! R is called a lower
prevision when it is interpreted as the supremum buying price in the sense that for every X 2K, P(X) is the
supremum of the prices one is willing to pay for obtaining X. For any lower prevision P, the conjugate func-
tional P : K! R, P ðX Þ :¼ P ðX Þ, is called an upper prevision. It is usually interpreted as the inﬁmum selling
price. In the theory of imprecise previsions, mainly two consistency conditions for lower previsions are introduced.
A lower prevision P is said to avoid sure loss if it satisﬁes one of the following equivalent conditions2 (cf. [11]):
(a) For all nP 1 and X 1; . . . ;Xn 2K,1 Wa
literatu
2 Th
containsup
X
Xn
i¼1
ðX i  PðX iÞÞP 0:(b) There exists a linear prevision P, i.e. a monotone linear functional restricted to K, such that
P(X)P P(X) for all X 2K.
Condition (a) justiﬁes the notion of avoiding sure loss as if it is violated then there is a combination of
transactions always resulting in a negative reward, i.e. a sure loss. A lower prevision P is said to be coherent
if it satisﬁes one of the following equivalent conditions2 (cf. [11]):
(a) For all nP 1, X i 2K and kiP 0, 0 6 i 6 n, !
sup
X
Xn
i¼1
kiðX i  P ðX iÞÞ  k0ðX 0  PðX 0ÞÞ P 0:lley has introduced this theory with probability currencies, but this has not been elaborated formally and is usually not used in the
re dealing with imprecise previsions.
e conditions diﬀer in their structural assumptions on the domainK. They are equivalent whenK is assumed to be a linear space
ing constant gambles.
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and superadditive functional dominating the inﬁmum, i.e.
(i) P(X)P infX
(ii) P(kX) = kP(X) for any kP 0
(iii) P(X + Y)P P(X) + P(Y).(c) There exists a non-empty set MðP Þ of linear previsions such that for all X 2K,
P ðX Þ ¼ min
P2MðPÞ
P ðX Þ:Condition (a) justiﬁes the notion of coherence as if it is violated then there are some X i 2K and kiP 0
such that k0ðX 0  ðP ðX 0Þ þ eÞÞ >
Pn
i¼1kiðX i  P ðX iÞÞ for some e > 0, i.e. P(X0) is too low compared to
P(X1), . . . ,P(Xn) to be regarded as the supremum buying price for X0. For any coherent lower prevision P,
the set D :¼ fX 2KjP ðX ÞP 0g is called the set of desirable gambles as one is willing to accept any of these
gambles for free. By setting k0 = 0 in condition (a), we obtain that coherent lower previsions also avoid sure
loss.
Although the deﬁnitions of avoiding sure loss and coherence do not presuppose any structure on K, it is
often much more convenient to presuppose thatK is a linear space containing constant functions. For coher-
ent lower previsions it is almost always no restriction to presuppose this structure as there exists a natural
extension of coherent lower previsions to the whole space of bounded, real-valued functions (cf. [11, section
3.1]). Hence, we implicitly assume K to be an appropriate linear space when necessary.3. On some interpretations in the theory of imprecise previsions
When buying or selling gambles one can distinguish between two types of gambles, those one initially holds
and those one is oﬀered to buy or to sell. We now show that there are strong indicators that the axiom
(A) The supremum buying price for a gamble is independent of any gamble initially held
is implicitly assumed to hold for (coherent) lower previsions. This axiom can be identiﬁed for the following
reasons: Formally, a functional representing a supremum buying price and enabling a possible dependence
between an oﬀered gamble and a gamble initially held either has to be deﬁned in two variables instead of
one or an initial gamble (naturally 0) has to be ﬁxed in the beginning and a way of how to proceed to the
general case of arbitrary initial gambles has to be provided. As (coherent) lower previsions are only deﬁned
in one variable, we now show that there are at least three hints that either Walley has not imposed any
restrictions on the initial gamble or that he was not aware of possible problems this can cause as will
be seen later on. First, initial gambles are not mentioned anywhere at least in [11]. Especially, the initial
gamble is not ﬁxed to be 0 anywhere. Second, gambles are only considered in the situation when they
are oﬀered, never as gambles one already holds as, for instance, desirability of gambles is only deﬁned
for oﬀered gambles (cf. [11, p. 60]), ‘‘In saying a gamble X is ‘desirable’ to You, we mean that You have
the disposition to accept X whenever it is oﬀered to You’’. Third, the conjugate upper prevision of a lower
prevision is always interpreted as the inﬁmum selling price of X by arguing that selling X equals buying
X. Therefore, in order to interpret P ðX Þ as a selling price for X and not only as a short selling price,
one has to allow to initially hold X. Hence, the gamble 0 cannot be ﬁxed as the initial gamble for upper
and thus for lower previsions without losing the commonly used behavioural interpretation of coherent
upper previsions. But precisely this behavioural interpretation of imprecise previsions was used to justify
the explicitly given axioms of coherent lower previsions. As a consequence of the preceding reasoning,
the above stated axiom is implicitly assumed to hold.
We now consider again the interpretation of coherent lower previsions. The standard and, according to
Walley, ‘‘minimal’’ interpretation is that for any gamble X the value P(X) is the supremum buying price for
the gamble X: P(X) is the supremum price l for which it is asserted that the gamble X  l is desirable to
You [11, section 2.3.1]. Walley repeatedly emphasizes his claim that one might also accept a buying price l
being higher than P(X) as long as it does not exceeds P ðX Þ (cf., e.g. [11, p. 60, 104]). This, in fact, means that
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tion allowing to accept buying prices that are not desirable. In this respect, one always has to emphasize that
P(X) is the supremum desirable buying price and not the supremum (acceptable) buying price. But the inter-
pretation of coherent lower and upper previsions in terms of desirability instead of acceptability is not behav-
ioural such that the justiﬁcation of the coherence axioms for imprecise previsions by the ‘‘behavioural
interpretation’’ is, to put it mildly, at least questionable. We will show in the next section how ‘‘acceptability’’
can and should be introduced into the theory of imprecise previsions.
Finally, we now focus on coherent preference relations. Interestingly, two diﬀerent coherent preference rela-
tions are introduced in [11] – one explicitly and the other implicitly.
The explicitly introduced coherent preference relation, the almost-preference relation¤ onKK withK
being a linear space containing constant gambles, is deﬁned via six axioms which are, in brief,
R0–R4 There exists a set D of desirable gambles such that X¤ 0 if and only if X 2 D.
R5 X¤Y if and only if X  Y¤0, i.e. X  Y 2 D.
Of course, the almost-preference relation is closely related to the other coherent models for uncertainty by axi-
oms R0–R4 (cf. [11, subsections 3.7.5, 3.7.6, and 3.8.1]). But in contrast to the binary relation ‘‘almost-pref-
erence’’, desirability is only an unary relation which means that the set of desirable gambles does not induce a
natural deﬁnition for a gamble to be more desirable than another gamble such that in this respect almost-pref-
erence is more informative than desirability. While the axioms R0–R4 are extensively and carefully justiﬁed
for the diﬀerent coherent models for uncertainty, the additional axiom R5 needed for extending the unary
coherent models to the binary coherent preference relation is justiﬁed in a diﬀerent and, as will be shown
in the sequel, inconsistent way than the others. The justiﬁcation of this axiom R5 according to Walley pro-
ceeds as follows (cf. [11, p. 153]):
(a) Let two compound gambles Z1 and Z2 be deﬁned according to the outcome of the toss of a fair coin by
Z1:¼X  Y and Z2:¼0 if the coin lands ‘‘head’’ and Z1:¼Z2:¼Y if the coin lands ‘‘tail’’.
(b) Z1 is equivalent to the gamble
1
2
ðX  Y Þ þ 1
2
Y ¼ 1
2
X , whereas Z2 is equivalent to 12 Y .
(c) Then, Z1 is preferred to Z2 if and only if X is preferred to Y which is equivalent to Z1(head) = X  Y is
preferred to Z2(head) = 0 as Z1(tail) = Z2(tail).
The above reﬂected justiﬁcation entirely relies on the identiﬁcation of the coin tossing part of the compound
gamble with its expected value in step (b).3 This is quite surprising in a theory about a sophisticated dealing with
risk and uncertainty. Unfortunately, Walley does not even give a hint why one should identify a gamble with its
expected value. Generally, non-additivity of a coherent lower prevision can be interpreted as a model of being
risk and/or uncertainty averse. Hence, even if there exists one canonical probability measure on the domain X
of the gambles it is quite natural to use a coherent lower prevision P that assigns to any gamble X less than its
expected value, i.e. that P is non-additive. Then the introduction of a combined gamble as outlined above
together with an identiﬁcation of the newly introduced coin tossing part with its expected value is deﬁnitely
not in line with the original interpretation of coherent lower previsions. That is because risk aversity being mod-
elled by a non-additive coherent lower prevision is extended in a risk neutral way by taking the expected value
to the larger domain X · {head, tail}. Therefore, axiom R5, i.e. that part of the almost-preference relation that
goes beyond desirability, i.e. beyond relating gambles to 0 is unjustiﬁed.
The second, implicitly introduced coherent preference relation is obtained from coherent lower previsions.
Once, there is a price system such that for every gamble there is a supremum buying price, gambles are com-
parable via these prices and thus the subsequent preference relation canonically comes up:
Deﬁnition 1. Let P be a coherent lower prevision on a set of gamblesK. We say that X is more desirable to Y
if one is willing to pay a higher price for X than for Y, i.e. if there exists a buying price l such that X  l is
desirable while Y  l is not or, equivalently, if P(X) > P(Y).3 Interestingly, this method was also used in the justiﬁcation of the axiomatization of desirability (cf. [11, 2.2.4]). But there, in contrast to
the present discussion, the respective axiom used to deﬁne desirability could be justiﬁed in a more convincing way.
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preference relation relates gambles in terms of desirability and not in terms of acceptability. In contrast to
the ﬁrst preference relation, this one does not presuppose any structure on the domain of the coherent lower
prevision.4. Coherent fair pricing
In this section, we will show how gambles that are initially held and the interpretation of acceptability can
naturally be introduced to the theory of imprecise previsions. The starting point of the subsequent analysis is
the following problem.
Problem 1. Let P be a coherent lower prevision on a set of gambles K and let X ; Y 2K. Suppose, you
initially hold the gamble X and you are oﬀered the gamble Y. Moreover, suppose4 FoP ðY Þ < 0 and P ðX þ Y Þ > P ðX Þ: 4Should Y be accepted or rejected?
To illustrate the problem, we now show that using coherent lower previsions to assess supremum buying
prices for oﬀered gambles and identifying desirability with acceptability generally prevents one from buying
insurances.
Example 1. Let X be the initial gamble and Y be an insurance for X which usually means YP 0 and
{Y > 0}  {X < 0}. Suppose both, the insurance company and you agree on one probability measure P to be
the objectively true one or at least to be in the set of possibly true ones (e.g. the mortality table in life insurance
or the equivalent martingale measure in mathematical ﬁnance). Then
(a) the insurance company asks for a premium l higher than the expected value EP(Y) of Y as it has to make
proﬁts and
(b) EP should be contained in the setMðP Þ of your coherent lower prevision (cf. condition (c) of coherent
lower previsions) as it would not be desirable to you to pay more than minP2MðPÞP ðY Þ for the gamble Y.
Since (a) and (b) imply l > EP(Y)P P(Y), you are supposed to consider the oﬀered insurance gamble
Y  l to be not desirable. On the other hand, if the premium l is not too high then usually
P(X + Y  l) > P(X) and Y  l would be commonly considered as being acceptable.
The following discussion of the above stated problem against the background of the discussion in the pre-
ceding section will lead to a completion of the theory of coherent imprecise previsions as acceptability is pre-
cisely introduced in this context. As P(Y) < 0, Y is not desirable but as PðY Þ > 0 which follows from
PðY ÞP PðX þ Y Þ  PðX Þ (cf. [11, 2.6.1(e)]), one might according to Walley anyhow accept the gamble for
some reasons to be speciﬁed. But since the theory of imprecise previsions bases on desirability instead of
acceptability, the above stated problem cannot be answered directly. Additionally, the set up of this problem
distinguishes between gambles that one initially holds and gambles that one is oﬀered. As coherent lower pre-
visions represent the supremum desirable buying price for oﬀered gambles, the values P(X) and P(X + Y) do
not have an immediate interpretation in this problem as only Y is oﬀered. In the sequel, we show how Walley’s
theory of imprecise previsions can naturally be completed in such a way that the above stated problem is
solved in a canonical way and that the imprecision in some interpretations in the theory of imprecise previ-
sions presented in the preceding section are solved.
In terms of the preference relation introduced in the preceding section, the gamble X + Y is more
desirable than X when both are oﬀered. But once one already accepted X as it might have been desirable
on its own, the option of rejecting Y would mean that one changed one’s mind about the preferencer instance, let K :¼ R½0;1, P:¼inf, X:¼id, and Y:¼id + 0.1.
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can not be used consistently when one takes into consideration gambles that one initially holds since one
would not be able to have a preference relation on gambles one ﬁnally holds. The reason is simply as
follows. One essential property of coherent lower previsions is superadditivity which is usually interpreted
as a model for diversiﬁcation. The diﬀerence P(X + Y)  P(X)  P(Y) contains some information about
how much more X and Y are desirable when held together than X and Y held separately. As P is only
deﬁned on oﬀered gambles, it ignores diversiﬁcation between an oﬀered gamble and a gamble that is
initially held.
Hence, we introduce acceptability as a property of an oﬀered gamble taking an initial gamble into account
in contrast to desirability which is a property of an oﬀered gamble ignoring an initial gamble.
Deﬁnition 2. Let K be a non-empty subset of L1. Let P be a coherent lower prevision on
KþKþ R ¼ fX þ Y þ ljX ; Y 2K; l 2 Rg.
(a) Given an initial gamble X, a gamble Y is called acceptable if P(X + Y)P P(X). The set of acceptable
gambles is denoted by AX ,AX :¼ fY jP ðX þ Y ÞP PðX Þg:
(b) The coherent fair prevision P(YkX) of a gamble Y given the initial gamble X is deﬁned byP ðY kX Þ :¼ supfl 2 RjP ðX þ Y  lÞP P ðX Þg:The term fair will be justiﬁed in Proposition 2. By deﬁnition, a coherent fair prevision is the supremum
acceptable buying price. If the setK is a convex cone containing constant gambles or even a linear space con-
taining constant gambles thenK ¼KþKþ R. In this setting, a classical coherent lower prevision P is inter-
preted to represent the supremum buying price when the initial gamble is 0. The following proposition
provides a simple reformulation of the deﬁnition of coherent fair previsions.
Proposition 1. A functional P(ÆkÆ) is a coherent fair prevision if and only if
(a) P(Æk0) is a coherent lower prevision,
(b) P(YkX) = P(X + Yk0)  P(Xk0) for all X,Y.
Deﬁnition 2 implies some corrections of the interpretations of coherent upper and lower previsions and we
now show why coherent fair previsions are called fair.
Proposition 2
(a) A coherent upper prevision P represents the infimum short selling price since P ðX Þ :¼ P ðXk0Þ for any
X 2K. In case the initial gamble is 0, the interval P ðX Þ; P ðX Þ½ therefore contains all prices that are con-
sidered to be too high to buy X but not high enough to short sell X, i.e. to bet against X.
(b) A coherent lower prevision P represents the fair price since it represents the supremum buying price as
P(X) = P(Xk0) as well as the infimum selling price as P(X) = P(XkX).
We now collect some elementary properties of coherent fair previsions.
Proposition 3
(a) AX and P(ÆkX) determine each other as AX ¼ fY jP ðY kX Þ > 0g and P ðY kX Þ ¼ supfljY  l 2AXg.
(b) From P(YkX) = P(YkX + Y) follows that P(YkX) represents the fair price of Y given X as P(YkX) is
the supremum buying price of Y when having X as well as the infimum selling price of Y when having X + Y.
(c) AX  D for every X 2K, i.e. every gamble Y being desirable to hold is also desirable to get independently
of one’s portfolio X.
(d) AX is convex.
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the fair price of the result to a greater extent than P(Y).
(f) P(Ykc) = P(Y), i.e. the fair price of a gamble Y to get is the same as the fair price of Y to hold when starting
with a constant gamble,
(g) P(kXkX) = kP(X) for any kP 0, i.e. the fair price of a gamble kX to get is the same as the fair price of this
gamble to hold when starting with X.
(h) P(ÆkX) is generally not positively homogeneous, i.e. it is not coherent.
(i) P(ÆkX) is a convex lower prevision, i.e. it satisfies(i) Y 6 Z implies P(YkX) 6 P(ZkX),
(ii) P(Y + ckX) = P(YkX) + c,
(iii) P(kY + (1  k)ZkX) P kP(YkX) + (1  k)P(ZkX).P(ÆkX) is even centered convex for every X (cf., e.g. [8]), i.e. P(0kX) = 0 which is equivalent to the property
that P(ÆkX) avoids sure loss. As a convex lower prevision, P(ÆkX) is representable byP ðY kX Þ ¼ inf
P2MðPÞ
fP ðY Þ þ aðP Þgand the property of being centered convex additionally implies infP2MðPÞaðP Þ ¼ 0. A natural choice for the func-
tion a in this situation is a(P):¼P(X)  P(X).
The proof consists of the application of Deﬁnition 2 and some simple calculations.
In this context, non-linearity of the fair price functional P can be interpreted as taking also the risk (var-
iability) of a gamble into account when calculating its fair price. For instance, diversiﬁcation reduces risk such
that the fair price of the sum of gambles should be higher than the sum of the single prices. In the next section,
we tackle the problem of decomposing a coherent lower prevision into a fair, risk-neutral valuation (linear
prevision, e.g. expected value) and a variability measure and characterize the class of variability measures that
can be a part of a coherent lower prevision.
5. Coherent variability measures
In this section we will characterize those functionals onK that can serve as a coherent variability measure
for a given risk-neutral valuation functional (linear prevision) P.
Deﬁnition 3. A functional V :K! Rþ is called a coherent variability measure if there exists a linear prevision
P such that P  V is a coherent lower prevision.
The class of coherent variability measures is non-empty since the zero functional, V = 0, is contained in this
class. Of course, any coherent lower prevision P can be decomposed into a linear prevision and a coherent
variability measure V: Using characterization (c) of coherent lower previsions, one trivially obtains
P = P  V for any P 2MðP Þ and V:¼P  P. This shows that there does not exist a unique decomposition
of a coherent lower prevision unless it is linear. For a given linear prevision P, we observe, again using char-
acterization (c) of coherent lower previsions, that a variability measure V is coherent if and only if there is a set
M of linear previsions including P such that V ðX Þ :¼ P ðX Þ minP 02MP 0ðX Þ. Another characterization which is
easier to check refers to characterization (b) of coherent lower previsions.
Lemma 1. A functional V :K! Rþ on a convex coneK is a coherent variability measure if and only if there
exists a linear prevision P such that
(a) P(X)  V(X)P infX,
(b) V(kX) = kV(X) for all kP 0,
(c) V(X + Y) 6 V(X) + V(Y).As a consequence of properties (a)–(c), we obtain V(X + c) = V(X) for every real constant c.
There are a lot of variability measures known and widely used but most of them are not coherent. In
Table 1, it is listed whether the above properties are satisﬁed (+) or not () for the variability measures range
Table 1
Properties of some variability measures
Variability measure q r2 r s
Property
E(X)  V(X)P infX    +
V(kX) = kV(X) +  + +
V(X + Y) 6 V(X) + V(Y) +  + +
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absolute deviation from median (s(X):¼E(jX MXj)).
We sketch the proof of s being a coherent variability measure and provide an example for
E(X)  V(X) < infX for V 2 {q, r2,r}.
First, we show that E  s is a coherent lower prevision. To do this, we use some results from Denneberg
(cf. [3, Example 5.4]) who suggested to use E + s as a premium principle in insurance mathematics (cf. [4]).
The functional E + s can be represented as a Choquet integral w.r.t. a concave set function l,
EðX Þ þ sðX Þ ¼ R Xdl. Since we haveZ
Xdl ¼ 
Z
Xdl ¼ EðX Þ  sðX Þ ¼ EðX Þ  sðX Þfor the Choquet integral w.r.t. the conjugate, convex set function l, it turns out that
R dl is a coherent lower
prevision (cf. [6, Proposition 3.4]) and s therefore is a coherent variability measure.
Now, we show E(X)  V(X) < infX for every V 2 {q, r2,r}. Let X:¼{0,1}, l: 2X! [0, 1] be a probability
measure deﬁned by l({0}) = .8, and X : X! R be X(0):¼4 and X(1) = 1. Then E(X) = 3, q(X) = 5,
r2(X) = 4, r(X) = 2 and E(X)  V(X) < infX for every V 2 {q,r2,r}.
Finally, we provide a characterization of the class of coherent variability measures without starting with a
coherent lower prevision or a linear prevision.
Proposition 4. A functional V :K! Rþ is a coherent variability measure if and only if
(a) V restricted to K0 :¼ fX 2Kj inf X ¼ 0g is a lower prevision avoiding sure loss, i.e.
sup
Pn
i¼1X i P
Pn
i¼1V ðX iÞ whenever nP 1 and X1, . . . ,Xn are in K0,
(b) V(kX) = kV(X) for all kP 0,
(c) V(X + Y) 6 V(X) + V(Y),
(d) V(X + c) = V(X) for all real constants c.
Proof. We only have to show that part (a) is equivalent to part (a) of Lemma 1 provided that the remaining
properties hold. Using V(X) = V(X  inf X),P ðX Þ  V ðX ÞP inf X () PðX  inf X ÞP V ðX  inf X Þ:
Thus, property (a) of Lemma 1 is equivalent to the existence of a linear prevision dominating V onK0. This is
again equivalent to V, restricted toK0, being a lower prevision avoiding sure loss by characterization (b) of
lower previsions avoiding sure loss. h
Coherent variability measures are therefore translation invariant, sublinear lower previsions which avoid
sure loss on K0. It should be noticed that though we just have used the denotation lower prevision avoiding
sure loss, this does not mean that V should be interpreted as a lower prevision. V(X) is the fair variability price
of a gamble X with fair price P(X). The linear prevision P + V is interpreted as the fair price when being risk-
neutral.
As mentioned before, P ðX Þ; PðX Þ½ is that interval of prices for X that are considered to be too high to make
X  l desirable, l 2P ðX Þ; PðX Þ½, but not high enough to be willing to bet against the gamble X. The existence
of such an interval can be explained in such a way that there is a risk of X that causes one to demand for a
discount of a risk-neutral valuation P(X) with a linear prevision P when buying or short selling X since
138 S. Maaß / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 49 (2008) 130–139P ðX Þ; P ðX Þ½¼PðX Þ  V ðX Þ;P ðX Þ þ V ðX Þ½¼ P ðX Þþ  V ðX Þ; V ðX Þ½:
Finally, we provide a relation between coherent fair previsions and coherent variability measures.
Proposition 5. Let P = P  V with a linear prevision P satisfying P(X) = P(X) for some X and a coherent
variability measure V. Then P(YkX) = P(Y)  V(X + Y), i.e. the fair price of a gamble Y to get given X is its
risk-neutral fair price reduced by the price for the variability (in terms of V) of the resulting portfolio.
Remark 1. The reason why the condition P(X) = P(X) is imposed on the linear prevision dominating P can be
justiﬁed by using the interpretation of P to represent for every Y the worst of all possible outcomes P(Y),
P 2MðP Þ (cf. characterization (c) of coherent lower previsions). Using such a prudent interpretation of coher-
ent lower previsions, it is quite natural that once the gamble X is held, one only needs to consider those pos-
sible linear prevision P 2MðP Þ yielding the worst possible outcome P(X).
In [10], Rockafellar et al. deal with generalized deviation measures obtained by some axiomatization. In
terms of that paper, coherent variability measures are lower range dominated deviation measures associated
with a coherent lower prevision (which can be identiﬁed with coherent risk measures, cf. Maaß [7, p. 86]). The
scope of this section goes beyond that paper as two characterizations of this special type of deviation measures
are given, in which the second (Proposition 4) even does not need to refer to a given linear prevision (or prob-
ability measure).
6. Outlook: replacing coherence by convexity
One main criticism against coherence as a consistency condition for valuation functionals is that positive
homogeneity is not desirable, especially when the price for a gamble is very high compared to one’s wealth.
Partly, this criticism misses the point as Walley was aware of this problem (cf. [11, p. 64]) and therefore
introduces probability currencies as the co-domain of imprecise previsions to avoid this problem. But as nearly
every related literature considers the real numbers as the co-domain of imprecise previsions and as coherent
risk measures also map risks (i.e. gambles) to real numbers, relaxing coherence to convexity by dropping
positive homogeneity is the obvious next step. This has been done for imprecise previsions for
instance by Pelessoni and Vicig in [9] and for risk measures by Fo¨llmer and Schied in [5]. It is very easy to
reformulate the presented results in the context of the convex theories. The corresponding terms are (cf.
Proposition 1):
Deﬁnition 4. The convex fair prevision P(YkX) of a gamble Y given the initial gamble X is deﬁned by
(a) P(Yk0) is a convex lower prevision,
(b) P(YkX) = P(X + Yk0)  P(Xk0).
A functional V :K! Rþ is called a convex variability measure if there exists a linear prevision P such that
P  V is a convex lower prevision.Acknowledgements
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